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dismiss or remand the case to the Commission. If evidence offered
to the court has not been submitted to the Commission, the correct
practice requires that such evidence be first submitted to the Com-
mission."8 In most instances the Commission's action will be
sustained as to awards for reparations. As was pointed out in
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Mechling,"4 judicial review
of the Commission's findings of fact and its exercise of expert
judgment within its statutory authority is extremely limited.
John C. Hood.
MARKETING QUOTAS AND THE FARMER
N Lee v. Roseberry' plaintiff tobacco producer sought judicial
review of her marketing quota under the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act (AAA) of 1938.2 Plaintiff's marketing quota of 1.8
acres in 1949 had been reduced to 1.5 acres for 1950, a reduction
of 14.7 per cent. The quota had been fixed by a county committee
acting under a proclamation of the Secretary of Agriculture re-
quiring a general reduction of 10%o in tobacco marketing quotas.
Existing legislation prohibited lowering of quotas of farmers hav-
ing allotments of .9 acre or less. When such farms were excluded
from the general 10 per cent reduction, farmers having allotments
of more than .9 acre had to assume a proportionally larger quota
reduction. Plaintiff attacked this legislation as unconstitutional
and sought a recomputation of her quota, a declaratory judgment
of her rights under the Act, and an injunction against state officers
of the Production, and Marketing Administration (PMA). The
court upheld the constitutionality of the Act and the quota fixed
thereunder.
33 Lang Transp. Corp. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 915 (S. D. Cal. 1948).
84330 U. S. 567 (1947).
194 F. Supp. 324 (E. D. Ky. 1950).
27 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 1281 et seq.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Almost every farmer and producer of agricultural commodities
in the United States has been, in recent years, subject to some
form of governmental control. At present, important regulation
is centered around marketing quotas, integrated with acreage allot-
ments and soil conservation payments. The Secretary of Agricul-
ture has the task of administering marketing quotas, and his au-
thority is derived from the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938.
Marketing quotas are a means of regulating the marketing of
commodities when supplies become excessive. The quantity of a
given commodity that will provide adequate supplies-the na-
tional marketing quota-is determined by the Secretary of Agri-
culture. This quantity is usually translated into terms of acreage.
The acreage is allotted among states, counties, and finally among
individual farms. The marketing quota for an individual farm is,
in effect, the quantity produced on the acreage allotment. Market-
ing quotas are proclaimed by the Secretary of Agriculture when-
ever supplies of commodities reach certain levels. Before such
quotas go into effect, it is necessary that at least two-thirds of the
producers of the commodities vote in favor of the marketing
quotas. After a favorable vote, the Production and Marketing
Administration takes over the main task of administering the
quotas. The PMA is directed by an Administrator, assisted by a
Deputy Administrator and four Assistant Administrators, with
main offices in Washington, D. C. There are several regional offices,
and, in addition, a state PMA office in every state, and numerous
county committees. The state PMA offices and county committees
are a key part of the PMA field organization. They advise on pro-
gram development and are responsible for local administration
of national programs. The county committee is composed of three
farmers elected annually by the other farmers of the county.' The
main job of the county committee is to apportion the marketing
quotas among farms.
3 Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, as amended, 49 STAT. 1149 (1936);
16 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 590 h(b).
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Whenever quotas are established for individual farms, fre-
quently some farmer feels that as to him the quota is discrimina-
tory or works an unusual hardship. To adjust such complaints of
individual farmers the Secretary of Agriculture, through the PMA,
has issued marketing review regulations.4 These review regula-
tions, which conform to the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938,
provide opportunity for an administrative hearing on the county
level through a county review committee,5 following determina-
tion of the quota by the county committee.
A farmer who desires review of his marketing quota must sub-
mit his application for review to the secretary of the county com-
mittee within fifteen days after receipt of notice of his quota.
His application must be accompanied by the original notice of the
quota mailed to him, together with other pertinent information,
and a statement of what he thinks his quota should be and the rea-
sons therefor. If any necessary information on the application for
review is omitted, the secretary will so inform the applicant by
registered mail, enabling him to amend his application in accord-
ance with review regulations. The secretary of the county commit-
tee acts as clerk of the review committee and files applications for
review with the review committee for action.
The review committee is composed of three farmers, appointed
by the Secretary of Agriculture. Members of the committee must
be residents of the county and may not be members of the county
committee. One member serves as chairman and another as vice-
chairman.6 Members of the review committee are paid a small sum
but may not be compensated for more than thirty days per year.
Hearings are usually held in the office of the county committee.
At least ten days' notice before each hearing is given to the appli-
4 The last marketing quota review regulations were issued on July 29, 1949, and
superseded all prior regulations issued under the AAA and amendments. These regu-
lations are issued under authority of 52 STAT. 62, 64, 66 (1938), 55 STAT. 92 (1941), 60
STAT. 237 (1946) ; 7 U. S. C. 1946 ed. §§ 1361-68, 1375 (b).
5 7 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 1363.
6 Various rules have been issued to cover situations arising when there is a vacancy
or absence; such rules are found in 7 C. F. R. §§ 711.13-711.15 (1949 ed.).
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cants. The time of the hearing may be changed from day to day
or adjourned to a new place by the chairman. The hearings are
required to be conducted in a fair and impartial manner, with
reasonable opportunity for all parties to be heard and produce
evidence. Either side may be represented by counsel.7
The application for review is read by the chairman, and he
requires the representative of the county committee to answer
orally or in writing so as to inform the applicant fully of the
issues of fact and law that are in dispute. This answer consists
mainly in a statement of the factors considered by the county com-
mittee in fixing the quota. Applicant has the burden of proof on
all issues of fact raised by him. Although the hearing is not con-
ducted along strict judicial lines, cross-examination of witnesses
is allowed.
The review committee requires notes to be taken of the hearing,
and the applicant may, at his expense, receive a verbatim record!s
All parties may file written arguments and proposed findings of
fact and conclusions, based on the evidence adduced at the hear-
ing, for consideration by the review committee. Every final deter-
mination by the review committee must be reduced to writing and
show the committee's disposition of the findings and conclusions
proposed by the parties. If the review committee decides against
the county committee's determination of the quota, it must point
out in what respect the county committee failed to apply the law.
The final decision, together with supporting documents, certified
as true, complete, and correct, is mailed to the applicant by the
clerk of the review committee.
If a hearing goes to a final determination, the review committee,
on its own motion or upon due application therefor, may, within
fifteen days from the date of mailing a copy of its determination
7 7 C. F. R. § 711.25 (c) (1949 ed.) states that either applicant or the Secretary of
Agriculture may be represented at the hearing, and that the county committee shall
be present or represented at the hearing.
8 Frequently, the state PMA committee asks for a transcript, and the applicant is
entitled to one of its copies if he so desires.
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to the applicant, reopen the hearing for the purpose of taking
additional evidence or of adding any relevant matter or document.
The review committee may reopen the hearing on behalf of the
Secretary of Agriculture within sixty days from the date of the
mailing of a copy of its determination to the applicant. The review
committee has power to dismiss, without a hearing, insufficient or
imperfect applications.
While the above comprises the content and effect of the regula-
tions issued by the Secretary of Agriculture, actual practice is
frequently less formal. When a farmer receives his quota, he may
inquire at the office of the county committee to ascertain how his
quota was determined. Mathematical errors may be changed there
without delay. Usually there is no further protest, and it is seldom
that appeal is taken from the final determination of a review com-
mittee.
The AAA provides for judicial review of the final determina.
tions of review committees. The applicant must begin his action
within fifteen days after the review committee's determination is
mailed to him by filing suit in a district court of the United States,
or in any state court of general jurisdiction in the county or dis-
trict where applicant's farm is located. In Larkin v. Roseberry9
such a proceeding was brought in the state court, but the defend-
ant review committee requested removal to the federal court. The
plaintiff protested that it was not a suit of such a civil nature as
was contemplated in the Federal Judicial Code,'" and that removal
was precluded by the section of the AAA governing judicial re-
view.'1 The court allowed the removal, however, and it seems most
likely that cases of this kind hereafter will be heard almost exclu-
sively in the federal courts.
The applicant must furnish bond to protect the Government
from court costs. Citation may be served on any member of the
9 54 F. Supp. 373 (E. D. Ky. 1944).
10 28 U. S. C. 1946 ed. §§ 41, 71.
11 7 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 1367.
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review committee. After citation the clerk of the review committee
files a certified copy of the record on which the determination was
made. All notices of suits are forwarded to the Hearing Clerk,
Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C. No member of the
review committee is allowed to make an appearance in his behalf
or on behalf of the committee, except in accordance with instruc-
tions from the Secretary of Agriculture.
The court review is limited to questions of law; if the findings
of the review committee are supported by the evidence, they are
conclusive as to findings of fact. The court may direct the review
committee to hear additional evidence if good reason for not pro-
ducing it at the hearing is shown, and the committee may revise
its determination on the basis of the new evidence. The court hears
the case upon the original record and supplements thereto. If the
court decides that the action of the committee was not in accord-
ance with law, the court may remand the case for reconsideration.
The commencement of such proceedings does not operate auto-
matically to stay the final determination of the review committee.
The constitutionality of the Act and authority of the Secretary of
Agriculture to issue regulations thereunder have been attacked in
several cases, and each time the validity of the Act has been up-
held.12
The administrative procedure outlined above is the exclusive
method by which parties may obtain judicial review of marketing
quotas. In Campbell v. West 3 the court held that applicant who
failed to protest the quota fixed by the county committee within the
fifteen days allowed in the Act was without standing to appeal to
the review committee and the court. In Hawthorne v. Fisher4 the
court stated that the administrative remedies provided in the Agri-
12 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942) ; Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38 (1939) ;
U. S. v. West Tex. Cottonoil Co., 155 F. 2d 463 (5th Cir. 1946); Usher v. U. S.,
146 F. 2d 369 (4th Cir. 1944) ; Rodgers v. U. S., 138 F. 2d 992 (6th Cir. 1943) ; Troppy
v. La Sara Farmers Gin Co., Inc., 113 F. 2d 350 (5th Cir. 1940); U. S. v. Biehunko, 55
F. Supp. 706 (S. D. Tex. 1944).
13 79 N. E. 2d 170 (Ohio C. P. 1948).
14 33 F. Supp. 891 (N. D. Tex. 1940).
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culture Adjustment Act of 1938 must be exhausted before judicial
review of marketing quotas and relief therefrom may be sought
in the courts.
Farmers and producers who plant acreage contrary to the allot-
ments assigned them by the county committee are subject to various
penalties. For instance, any farmer who produces wheat in excess
of the quota allotted to him is subject to a penalty of fifteen cents
per bushel, or 50 per cent of the basic loan rate on the excess
bushels marketed, or both.15 The basic loan rate is the amount that
the Government will loan a farmer on his commodity. This basic
loan rate is usually described in terms of "parity," which is a
formula by which the commodity is given the same purchasing
power as it had during a given base period in terms of prices
which farmers had to pay for goods they purchased, interest on
mortgage indebtedness, taxes on farm real estate, and wage rates
for hired labor. After the parity price is determined, the Govern-
ment will loan money up to 90 per cent of the parity price to
those producers of agricultural commodities who cooperate with
marketing quotas. For example, if the parity price on a bushel of
wheat is determined to be $2.00, the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion will loan $1.80 per bushel of wheat. For those who refuse to
cooperate with marketing quotas that are in effect, the penalty may
be 90 cents per bushel on the excess bushels available for market-
ing. In addition, a producer's eligibility for price support loans
and payments is made conditional on the producer's complying
with acreage allotments, production goals, and marketing quotas
(when authorized by law). Acreage allotments may be proclaimed
by the Secretary of Agriculture although marketing quotas are
not authorized by the referendum. 6 If acreage allotments alone
are in effect, farmers who produce the commodity on acreage in
excess of their acreage allotments are not subject to penalties on
15 7 U. S. C. 1946 ed. §§ 1339, 1340.
1"Acreage allotments are a means of adjusting supplies of field crops. This is
accomplished by apportioning the national acreage among individual farms. These




marketing the "excess" production of the commodity, but their
eligibility for price support is affected.
Enforcement of these penalties is by the several district attor-
neys, on direction of the Attorney General or on request by the
Secretary of Agriculture. In Smith Land Co. v. Christensen7 the
applicant protested his acreage allotment and the imposition of
a penalty based upon production of seven hundred excess bushels.
The court re-affirmed the principles of judicial review, stating that
no new issues of fact, other than constitutional ones, could be
introduced before the court, and holding that as the review com-
mittee had nothing to do with the imposition of the penalty, this
question could not be reviewed. In Usher v. U. S." the Govern-
ment was successful in collecting penalties, the court pointing out
that judgment in the civil action would be based upon the pre-
ponderance of evidence. In U. S. v. Locke 9 the producer planted
in excess of the acreage allotment assigned him by the county
committee, and the United States sought to collect the penalties
on the excess that was planted and harvested, even though none
of the commodity had been marketed. The court upheld the right
of the Government to collect the penalties, stating that producers
who refused to participate in the agricultural conservation pro-
gram and produced and harvested wheat far in excess of acreage
allotments were subject to the marketing penalty as provided for
in the Act, even if the excess was consumed by the producer. In
U. S. v. Biehunko" the Government asked not only for penalties
for prior years but also for an injunction against the defendant,
who had previously refused to pay penalties and had maintained a
hostile attitude toward the program. The court refused injunctive
relief since, no matter how hostile defendant may have been, the
Government had failed to show threat of any unlawful or inequita-
ble act." Dale A. Williams.
17 148 F. 2d 184 (10th Cir. 1945).
18 146 F. 2d 369 (4th Cir. 1944).
19 56 F. Supp. 999 (M. D. Tenn. 1944).
20 55 F. Supp. 706 (S. D. Tex. 1944).
21 The Agricultural J. ,istment Act of 1938 has no provision for injunctive relief.
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